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Panel: Impacts of EU Involvement on National Party Organization

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The European Union and Party Politics in Central Europe

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EU involvement and Europeanization

It is only recently that political scientists have begun to focus on the influence of European Union (EU) involvement on national parties. Peter Mair’s study of the impact of Europe on the parties of Western Europe (WE) is now a standard point of reference, and relatively little divergence can be seen from his view that the direct impact of EU involvement has been strictly limited. An extensive research project on the Europeanization of national party organizations has recently been completed and it, too, seems to have found little evidence that European-level decision-making has greatly changed the balance of power within national political parties. In the past few years, publications on Central Europe (CE) developments have also begun to appear. Empirical studies of the Europeanization of CE parties have, however, been less common than work on EU effects in related fields. Rather more has been published, for example, on aspects of leverage and conditionality in the accession process as well as on the Europeanization of specific policy areas. There have been more institutional studies in areas like the judiciary and the reform – or effectively Europeanization – of the core executive than in the sphere of party politics.

Studies of CE party change also raise rather different questions from those relating to established WE party systems even in the common environment of European integration. The integration of the CE countries and the influence associated with enlargement would generally be identified as a form of environmental trend rather than a discrete event, although Carter et al. suggest (without further argument or evidence) that this may be less appropriate for more recent EU members. This environmental context has had a major constitutive effect on the development of competitive party politics in the former communist region to the extent that the Europeanization of CE party politics is virtually indistinguishable from the general process of democratization. Nevertheless any uniform EU impact or harmonious process of Europeanization in this area is inherently unlikely. The concept of environmental adaptation has already proved to be problematic in relation to established member states, the differences between national political systems and the EU resulting in dissimilar party organizational actors. The outcome has been the emergence within the region of relations characterized by a mixed supranational-intergovernmental logic with the intergovernmental (i.e. national) influence dominating.

European models of party development have certainly been influential in CE since the early days of post-communist change. The original programme of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, the main successor of the former ruling party, was for example formulated to fulfil the ‘basic criteria contained in the programmes of European social-democratic parties’. Equally, Solidarity Election Action in its early days was faced with clear organizational choices involving the allocation of a specific role to the trade union within the party, along the lines of the British Labour Party, or the
formation of a federal grouping analogous to the French RPR (the Gaullist Rally for the Republic) or UDF (Union for French Democracy). Adopting a European, or ‘Western’ orientation, was also one way of avoiding a more precise identification of political position in national terms. As Zbigniew Bujak observed when questioned about the stance of the proto-party ROAD (Civic Movement: Democratic Action) in 1990, it was not so much situated on the left or right but was rather ‘West of centre’. Close attention has continued to be paid by CE politicians to pan-European models and, more recently, Estonian Prime Minister Juhan Parts argued that the country’s party system should develop on general European lines and take specific account of European networks.

One perspective on the specific nature of CE party change has been suggested by Attila Ágh in a proposal that the Europeanization of CE parties should be distinguished in its external and internal dimensions. External Europeanization is understood to be an elite-based process in which contacts with, as well as possible membership of, international party organizations have developed and CE party programmes values and public discourses have changed accordingly. Internal Europeanization is a process reaching down to membership and constituency level in which internal party organization and popular perceptions are also affected. In more extreme cases this distinction suggests that CE party change may be decidedly two-faced and contain significant internal contradictions, with Europeanization being something of a cosmetic process that leaves the internal roots of the party organization largely unchanged.

An explanation for the rapid decline of the Polish Union of the Democratic Left (SLD), for example, drew attention to the growing discrepancy between the party’s European image and a domestic political practice that perpetuated organizational practices more associated with the communist period. The capacity to ‘speak European’ did seem to have been mastered and Europeanization was indeed effective in this sense – but it was a skill mostly deployed in Brussels, and successful ministers had also to nurture their domestic roots and develop ‘an ability to hold two diametrically opposite views at the same time’. While SLD might well have been quite successful in adapting externally to the European party model, satisfying criteria for membership of the Socialist International and joining the Party of European Socialists, attention was thus directed to the negative effects of its attachment to old political habits in terms of domestic organization and internal processes.

Signs of the ‘polonization’ of the party in terms of its factionalism and growing internal squabbles were also identified in this context. A growing dissatisfaction of members in the middle levels of the party after 2001 was observed due to their lack of influence on government policy and failure to share in the division of perceived material benefits. It was also claimed that in the eyes of much of the public SLD clung to the organizational legacy of the former United Workers’ Party and, quite simply, maintained the dominance of the old communist apparatus. The downfall of SLD was thus defined as
the real end of post-communism in Poland and, it was pointed out, ‘the coincidence in time with entry of our country to the EU strengthens and may well perpetuate this effect’.15

This kind of distinction can only be drawn in a CE context, of course, and party-relevant differences between Eastern and Western Europe are certainly striking in many respects. Stability is one major factor. Party systems in longer lasting liberal democracies have been characterized not just by stability but also by a remarkably high degree of durability.16 Of the twenty-three democracies in existence during the late 1950s only four had a radically different party system thirty years later. By the 1970s major changes were perceived in Denmark, Norway and Ireland in ways that seemed to contradict prevalent ideas of ‘frozen’ party systems, but over the longer term the changes made did not seem quite so significant. Of the eight parties that made up the Danish system at the time of the 1990 election six had also gained a significant portion of the vote in 1971.17 In CE only the Czech Republic – and perhaps Slovenia – could show such stability over the twelve-year period from 1992, and in many countries stable party systems are notable primarily for their complete absence.18

Europeanization clearly plays some role in the arena of CE party politics, then, but it is debatable if the regional or national conditions are in place for it to make a profound or direct impact on party structures on a universal basis. Conditions of strong party system instability may, however, provide one kind of exception here.19 Existing data seem to convey different messages. While formal commitment to European integration and a general pro-EU policy orientation is largely inevitable in CE, any broad-based political force also finds it difficult to avoid the emergence of some Eurosceptic tendencies within its own ranks.20 The likely implications of EU enlargement in this respect similarly pointed in quite different directions: while there may well have been considerable scope for anti-accession activity in party systems overall there were no strong prospects of it taking root in parties close to the political centre.21

There were certainly few signs of such opposition or of firm positions being taken in early votes on EU issues. At the time of the 2003 referendums EU enlargement did not generally emerge as a viable issue for interparty competition but was often regarded as a matter of national interest and a factor more likely to disrupt internal party unity if discussed in any detail. Such perceptions reinforced the view that Estonian parties, for example (probably little different from most others in the region), were not fully engaged in the accession process and the broader move to European integration.22 In Slovenia the EU referendum was held together with that on NATO membership – which was in fact a topic of greater government concern and may well have been the primary focus of attention for some of the committed Euroskeptics (NATO membership was rejected by more voters than EU accession).23 In Poland there was substantial evidence of tactical voting in the referendum – i.e. potential anti-
accession voters decided not to participate as more effective way of expressing opposition than actually turning out to cast a negative vote.\(^{24}\)

Elections to the European Parliament (EP) in June 2004 in some ways seemed to reflect established European experience.\(^{25}\) Turnout was low, European issues were prominent by their absence, and voters used the opportunity to register their dissatisfaction with the government. The choice that faced the electorate was not always as clear-cut as it might have been, either. Parliamentary elections had been held just the previous year in Estonia, but by June 2004 voters were faced with a ‘fast and impressive shift of rhetoric by most of the mainstream political actors’, while prominent former Eurosceptics decided to run under the labels of known pro-EU parties.\(^{26}\) More distinctive about the CE elections was the high degree of instability they indicated, in line with general observations of the outcome of national elections held during the post-communist period.\(^{27}\) There were, however, preliminary indications that European integration had become a more salient and contested issue since 1999 in most countries involved and that incentives for parties to take a firmer position on EU issues had strengthened.\(^{28}\)

Nor did national elections held soon after those for the EP always follow the path that voters had seemed to choose in June 2004. A newly formed Labour Party in Lithuania won 30.2 percent of the EP vote and went on to gain 28.6 percent nationally four months later. But elsewhere New Slovenia (NS) topped the EP list with 23.6 percent of the vote, but then received 9.0 percent nationally just a few months later. NS had been formed in 2000 when it won 8.6 percent of the vote, remarkably similar to the 9.0 percent it got in 2004. The difference for the EP elections was made by former prime minister Peterle who had more recently applied his efforts to work at the European level and immediately helped raise the party’s poll ranking when it was announced that he would head the New Slovenia EP list.\(^{29}\) A strong showing in the EP elections was by no means a domestic party asset, then, as successful politicians moved straight out of the national arena to the European level.

**EU impacts on national party politics**

Subsequent observations and a more general survey confirm that there has been little *direct* impact of the EU on the party politics of the new CE member states.\(^{30}\) As in established member states the format of CE party systems has not generally been affected, although integration has had somewhat greater consequences for their mechanics.\(^{31}\) As suggested by G. Marks and C. Wilson, it may be concluded that ‘Europe’ has exerted an influence that is both pervasive and quite profound – but by no means direct.\(^{32}\) With respect to the overall outcomes of EU involvement there was little immediate sign that ‘populists and demagogues’ were significantly encouraged or that predictions of major instability had been borne out.\(^{33}\)
There was, indeed, pervasive governmental fallout throughout the region after the EP elections of 2004 – but it may be questioned, firstly, how far party or government unpopularity was linked with EU issues and, secondly, how negative the political repercussions actually were. The Czech government did, indeed, fall soon after the elections – but a new government was soon formed by the same parties and with most of the same ministers. In Hungary the EP elections also led to the replacement of the prime minister and to conflict within the major governing party – but that helped produce conditions for longer-term government durability rather than presaging persistent instability. After further national legislative elections however – five were held in a thirteen-month period from September 2005 to October 2006 – the general picture was rather different. Central Europe started looking rather ‘unhinged’ and the core Visegrad states ‘displayed a worrying tendency to plunge back into populism, nationalism, Europhobia, and reform-aversion, which, according to the EU “script” was supposed to firmly a thing of the past’.

Broadly speaking, though, populist parties and apparently extremist forces turned out to be quite restrained in their response to eventual EU accession and were often receptive to the political opportunities offered by EU membership. It may well be that it is the immediate pre-accession period which provides the greatest opportunities for anti-EU forces – it was the 2001 elections that saw the rise of clearly Eurosceptic parties in Poland and those in Bulgaria during 2005 that saw the rise of the Ataka coalition. Anti-EU parties have, as suggested earlier, tended to cluster on the margins of the party system or, if they have persisted and continued to show serious political ambitions, moderated their outlook and moved towards the political centre.

Neither does it seem to be the case that accession has coincided with or caused any general crisis of CE party systems. In the early post-accession elections there were indeed major shocks in Lithuania, with the irruption of the Labour Party, and in Slovenia, with the success of the Democratic Party and the relative failure of Liberal Democracy. But neither of these developments could be readily linked with EU influence. The Labour Party (together with the Liberal Democrats and Agrarians in Lithuania) was one in a series of new Baltic parties to threaten the status quo, while Slovenia’s Liberal Democracy had finally come to the end of a long period of political supremacy. The Polish election of September 2005 did indeed bring further elements of instability into play, but this was hardly a novelty in the Polish context and was occasioned more by the near-total collapse of the political left due to domestic factors than by any direct EU influence. More striking, on the other hand, was the outcome of the 2006 Slovak election, which saw the victory of Fico’s populist Smer party and the formation of a coalition with Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the more extreme Nationalists.
Most recent country surveys have nevertheless drawn the explicit conclusion that the EU has so far had little direct influence on national party politics and that enlargement has equally had little direct political impact. Parties ignored European policy issues in the Latvian election of October 2006 and, somewhat more surprisingly in view of subsequent developments, the EU was also absent from debate in the run-up to the Hungarian election held some months earlier. In the latter case, it seemed, the political class now judged the EU issue ‘to be without significant electoral potential’. But this is by no means the whole story, and there is a range of other ways in which the extent of EU influence on CE party politics can be gauged. The first of these concerns the overall shape and composition of the national party system.

The changing boundaries and structures of party systems

As anticipated, European integration has generally acted to constrain coalition alternatives more in Central Europe than in the West. This has mostly happened through the censure and marginalization of more radical parties. Mainstream parties are obviously not keen on cooperating with extremist parties anyway. But in some cases domestic logic would probably have led them to consider maintaining or forging closer links with particular parties (Greater Romania, Party of Hungarian Life and Justice: MIÉP) if the international environment, most obviously the EU, had not made such considerations unfeasible. The gradual strengthening of EU impact is detectable throughout the 1990s in this respect, as radical parties initially participated in the Slovakian and Romanian governments but were later gradually squeezed out of the government arena. The Slovak case has been universally regarded as the most spectacular since, as Vachudova suggests, the EU used its leverage ‘very directly and deliberately to change…policies and to dislodge [the HZDS coalition] from power’. This view has become increasingly questioned, though, as other observers suggest that the removal of the Mečiar-led government from power was driven by domestic and not EU factors. The fact that issues concerning the EU had a high profile in Slovak politics did not mean that the EU itself exerted a direct influence on political processes. The strength of EU influence in this respect clearly demands further attention in the light of the situation after the 2006 elections, which saw not just HZDS but also the Nationalists brought into government. The issue here may be not so much the general tendency of EU influence as the capacity to bring it to bear effectively in specific countries and at particular times, two of the most interesting and complex questions currently raised in the Europeanization and conditionality literature. It should also be noted that HZDS had changed considerably since the 1990s – to the extent that in 2006 its Euro-compatibility was proclaimed in terms of the promise that ‘all the evils of life would be eliminated by the flow of EU funds’ – and its electoral appeal to more Eurosceptic voters correspondingly reduced. This was a major electoral bonus for the Nationalists.
Generally speaking, cooperation with the EU has constrained the policy realm as well. Mainstream parties, particularly those in government, have had little opportunity to exploit the political attractions of economic populism. For established leftist parties European – and global – economic pressures have indeed presented a major challenge. Virtually all have moved to the centre in terms of policy and in consequence experienced serious internal tensions in this respect. The decline in their public support in Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland and the Czech Republic may be partly explained by the fact that they became unable to present themselves as credible representatives of the lower classes. It is not accidental that in recent years a new, leftist-populist group of parties has appeared (Smer, Self-Defence, the Communist Party of Slovakia, Lithuanian Labour) in a process that parallels the social democratization of the major leftist parties. Neither did EU influence do much to enhance the capacity to bridge the cultural/ethnic divide in the more fragmented societies of the Baltic region.\(^48\)

The position of the extremist parties themselves in CE party systems has also undergone some change. Although radical nationalist forces have strengthened in Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia in recent years, the moderation or decline of radical forces has occurred elsewhere. Two large parties, the Slovak HZDS and the Greater Romania Party (PRM), changed their position on a number of sensitive issues and began to present themselves as mainstream, EU-compatible parties, a shift that was only short-lived in the case of the PRM as it did not bring the anticipated international dividends. The position of Hungary’s MIÉP and the Czech Republicans (SPR-RSČ) weakened. In general, many parties have toned down their nationalism and became more tolerant of minorities, a process with particular significance in the Baltic states.

It is difficult to detect any robust EU impact on the consolidation or destabilization of party systems. In Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania and Bulgaria there seems to be more fluidity and higher fragmentation now than during the 1990s, and even the role of personalities in these countries seems to have increased recently to the detriment of programmatic parties. This can be regarded as a tendency at least partly reinforced by the EP elections.\(^49\) On the other hand, Hungary and the Czech Republic saw a yet greater proportion of the vote taken by the two largest parties, while no clear trend is observable in the case of Romania, Estonia (where the Centre Party split over EU-related issues), and Slovenia. It is not possible to speak of any unidirectional impact in the short run. The road to accession and participation in the consensual EU decision-making mechanisms have not led to less polarized domestic politics overall but has engendered more amicable relations in some cases. Agreement on the accession imperative also contributed to the rapprochement of the National Movement of Simeon the Second (NDSV) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), while common membership of the ALDE has strengthened coalition possibilities between the Reform and Centre Parties in Estonia.\(^50\)
Standardization of party ideologies and the role of the Europarties

European integration was expected to hasten the decline of idiosyncratic party ideologies and consolidate the dominance of standard European party families and this expectation, with some notable exceptions, has been met. Parties increasingly orient themselves towards one of the standard European families. They have adopted the European symbols of their respective party families, and some of them have changed their name to signify compatibility with major European ideologies: the Estonian Moderates turned into Social Democrats, Romanian Humanists became Conservatives, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party a Social Democratic Party, and the right wing Slovenian Social Democrats eliminated the ‘Social’ from their name. Other parties added ‘European’ qualifiers to their name: the Hungarian Free Democrats became a ‘Liberal Party’, the HZDS and the Greater Romania Party added ‘People’s Party’, while Smer adopted the title ‘Social Democracy’. These changes happened just before or straight after accession.

There is also a considerable degree of ideological borrowing going on, often bridging significant cultural and political gaps. Christian Democracy, originally a product of liberal Catholicism, is imitated in Orthodox countries, while social democracy is copied by ex-communist parties. The big players that set the standards – the Christian Democrat, Socialist and Liberal federations – were of course active well before accession but membership has strengthened cooperation. Conversely, Eastern enlargement also gave a major boost to the activities of the party federations.

On the basis of individual party profiles, it seems that in Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania it is the socialist parties that are the most ‘standardized’ or ‘Europeanized’ in organizational and ideological terms. In Estonia, Latvia and Romania the Liberals are the closest to their European counterparts. In Slovakia the Christian Democrats are the most embedded in European ideological and organizational structures, with the important difference that here the liberal and Christian elements of Western Christian Democrats have been organized into two different parties. There still exist a number of major ‘non-standard’ parties, particularly in Slovakia (HZDS, the National Party: SNS), Poland (Self-Defence, the League of Polish Families: LPR) and Lithuania (Labour, Liberal Democrats). The convergence towards European patterns is also held back by the appearance of new parties with vague populist profiles.

Which European federation (Europarty) is joined also depends on which Europarty is in need of a local partner. When a Europarty does not have a local member, a vacuum emerges in the international political system that may suck in parties that are already members of other European party federations. When the Christian Democrats fell out of the Romanian parliament three major national parties, the Liberals, Democrats and Humanists, began to gravitate towards the European People’s Party. The
strength of the vacuum depends on the size of the Europarty and its ideological compatibility with local traditions. But even taking these factors into account, the current success of the EPP and the failure of the Greens is remarkable and provides, in Bartolini’s view, a clear example of the dominance of politico-institutional imperatives and a strong ‘alliance expansion logic’. There have also been cases when newcomers were rejected due to the efforts of their better entrenched domestic rivals: the Bulgarian Union of Democratic Forces (ODS) obstructed the attempts of NDSV to join the European People’s Party (EPP), while the Slovak Social Democrats tried to block Smer’s application to join PES.

But relations with Europarties are not based exclusively on pragmatic principles. The Romanian Democrats have been following right-wing economic policies for quite some time, and Polish Law and Justice (PiS) abandoned its relationship with EPP because of opposition to various European initiatives, including the Constitutional Treaty. The change in affiliation of Hungary’s Fidesz did not precede its ideological transformation but followed it. Ideological criteria often guide the policies of the Europarties, too. CE parties have either not been accepted (like the Slovak HZDS or Romania PRM) or expelled (Hungary’s Christian Democratic People’s Party: KDNP) because their position was at odds with the norms of the particular party family. The most dramatic move, however, has been the historic suspension of Smer from the PES because of its coalition with the National Party.

Parties inside the federations may use their influence to help allies in the domestic arena. This happened in Bulgaria when the (Turkish) Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) helped Tsar Simeon’s party join the liberal party family. Small parties that have a ‘European’ pedigree but lack domestic electoral support become attractive partners for political marriages. The Social Democratic Party and the Party of the Democratic Left in Slovakia, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the Romanian Social Democratic Party were minuscule parties, and yet Smer, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Romanian Party of Social Democracy were happy to fuse with them because this was the way for them to get into the Socialist federation (and underline their break with communist traditions).

Being a member of the same European federation and the same EP faction has facilitated closer cooperation between parties in some countries (like the Reform Party and the Centrists in Estonia) but had no observable impact in others where inter-party relations have remained tense (New Era and the People’s Party in Latvia, Fidesz and the Democratic Forum: MDF in Hungary). A stronger argument has been made that both PES and EPP significantly affected the political and electoral dynamics of the right and left in Bulgaria. Chiva seems to agree with this interpretation in the case of Romania, but also emphasizes the strategic use of the EU by domestic elites in order, for example, to validate policies, choices and identities. Both, however, seem to agree that the impacts of EU involvement
were stronger in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania than in the previous accession countries. In Croatia, a country that still has candidate status, there is also evidence that the EPP played an important active role in the transformation of the Croatian Democratic Union after 2000, propelling it to the forefront of democratic national politics and the country to the threshold of EU membership.59

The role of the European issue

While public Euroscepticism has increased somewhat during the last years, most of the parties that were against EU membership before accession (like the Slovenian National Party, Hungarian Labour Party, Polish LPR and Self-Defence) do not now propose withdrawing. In this sense we can speak of a general softening of party-based Euroscepticism. In a few cases attitudes towards the EU have led to significant internal tensions within parties. In the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Estonian Centre Party one of the major reasons for internal conflicts was the Euroscepticism of their leaders. In the former case the Eurosceptic tone was damped down prior to the 2006 election once it became clear that it was a significant vote loser.60

Close analysis of CE party systems shows that many parties have complex, and often quite adaptable, attitudes towards the EU. The dichotomies or even four-fold tables used in the literature to describe the positions of parties in this respect have proved to be simplistic.61 Even parties typically classified as hard Eurosceptic have in fact shown more nuanced views, as the case of the Czech Communists (KSČM) demonstrates.62 One of the difficulties of these classifications is that there are parties that are not so much anti-EU as non-EU compatible (like the Greater Romania Party or HZDS). Put differently there are parties which should, given their fundamental values, oppose the EU but do not do so. Obviously, all parties must face the fact that the region will be a net recipient of EU funds for a long time to come. It is logical, therefore, that many CE nationalist parties (Slovenian National Party, For Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement, Liberal Democratic Party of Lithuania, Fidesz, PiS and so on) typically shy away from direct opposition to the EU, or even that Poland’s Self-Defence came out in 2006 as a virtual Europhile.63 Such ‘government-induced’ changes in attitude have also been documented in WE cases.64

In most countries of the region it is still largely disadvantageous for a party to be labelled Eurosceptic or an EU non-conformist. Before accession the accusation of an opponent that a party was endangering integration was routinely used as a political weapon. In situations where there was high public support for membership and where the country still met with serious obstacles to achieving it (like Romania, Slovakia or Bulgaria) it was beneficial for parties (and particularly for those in opposition) to present themselves as the most pro-European actors: it cost little and brought sympathy both from abroad and from the voters. There are, however, also sectoral parties that do not need to
bother that much about the general climate of opinion – agrarians like the Peasant Party (PSL) in Poland, Smallholders in Hungary, and the People’s Union in Estonia, as well as communist parties like KSČM, the Workers’ Party in Hungary and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). At the other end of the spectrum there also exists a group of principled liberal Euroenthusiast parties, that is parties ready to support federalist ideas. But these parties (Free Democrats in Hungary, Latvia’s Way, Freedom Union – now the Democratic Party – in Poland) are typically small and declining, although they did relatively well in the first EP elections.

In the 1990s the dimensions of Euroscepticism and authoritarianism largely coincided. This has now changed somewhat with the more critical position currently being taken by large mainstream parties like the Czech ODS, the Estonian Res Publica and Centrum, and, to some extent, the Hungarian Fidesz. The results of the Dutch and the French referendums showed that opposition to various aspects of integration is acceptable throughout Europe. The CE public has gradually realized that to be somewhat Eurosceptic does not equate to being anti-Western, and even less anti-democratic. The liberal policies followed by some of the most economically successful countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia) increasingly show the potential for a Euroscepticism based on economic liberalism, although it is only in the Czech Republic that this potential developed into conflict in terms of party competition. As D. Malová and T. Haughton have pointed out with reference to Slovakia, ‘A desire to integrate prior to joining does not necessarily imply that a country will be strongly in favour of further integration once in the club’. Rather presciently (as writing before the 2006 election), they also indicate that the EU should be wary of countries with a weak and fragmented opposition which increases electoral unpredictability, ‘allowing more scope for unpalatable parties to come to power’.

In terms of the relationship between Euroscepticism and the left-right ideological continuum, the picture is complex and shows features different from those found in WE. In most countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and, more recently, Estonia) Eurosceptic parties appear on both the right-wing nationalist (SNS, MIÉP, Ataka, LPR, to some extent ODS) and radical left (KSČM, Hungarian Labour Party, Association of Workers of Slovakia, Communist Party of Slovakia, Self-Defence) ends of the party spectrum. In the Baltic countries the little opposition there is to the EU mainly comes from organizations representing minorities and the agrarian population. In the remaining countries opposition comes mostly from the right wing of the party spectrum (Slovenia: National Party, Romania: PRM). On average, and at party level, it is right-wing Euroscepticism that seem to be more robust than that on the left, a view that is largely congruent with Bielasiak’s analysis.

This conclusion may seem to contradict the recent findings of Marks and his colleagues (Marks et al., 2006), who report a positive correlation between right wing and pro-EU attitudes. Note, however, that
they define the left-right scale in terms of economic policy while there are a number of CE parties that
are right wing in all respects apart from their attitudes on the economy. ‘Right’ and ‘left’ have
different political meanings in different countries. In Hungary and Poland they do not refer to
differences in economic policy but to ideological cleavages relating to religious differences and
judgements on the communist past.67 With the exception of Estonia and the Czech Republic, party
positions on economic and social policy issues are far less helpful in post-communist countries than in
the West in defining identity in terms of left and right.68 Secondly, they give equal weight to all parties
with more than three per cent of the vote, while different sized parties obviously affect the party
system to a different degree.69 In our view, leftist Euroscepticism in Central Europe is mainly voiced
by isolated communist parties that lack coalition potential.

**Political representation in the European Union**

The contrast between popular and party-based attitudes towards the EU is indicative of the general
quality of political representation in the region, although it is an issue that generally has secondary
relevance for voters. P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak differentiate between four groups of countries:
where Euroscepticism is (1) high or (2) low both in public and in the party system, and where there is
a greater EU-sceptic orientation (3) in the elite or (4) in the public.70 The first group comprises Latvia,
Estonia, Czech Republic and Poland, the second – Bulgaria, the third – Romania, Slovakia and
Hungary, and the fourth – Slovenia and Lithuania. T. Beichelt has also analyzed the correspondence
between party and mass-based Euroscepticism, labelling the latter two, discrepant groups as ‘over’ and
‘under-mobilized’.71 His results differ sharply from Taggart and Szczerbiak’s, however. He includes
Poland and the Czech Republic in the first group, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia and Bulgaria in the
second, in the third are placed Slovakia and Romania, and in the fourth Estonia and Latvia. The
assessment presented here differs from both classifications. It is closer to Beichelt’s, although the
Czech Republic appears more as a case of over-mobilization while in Slovenia Euroscepticism seems
to be rather under-mobilized.

In a few cases there has been blatant misrepresentation, in the sense of large discrepancies between the
party’s attitudes and those of its voters. The Czech ODS and Estonian Res Publica during its 2003
campaign are cases in point. But while Res Publica paid a high electoral price for its attitude, ODS
moderated its Euroscepticism and continued to command the support of its base. When voters regard
the European issue as secondary (which is typically the case), when the position on this issue is well
integrated into the overall ideology of the party and when citizens are not worried about being
excluded from the EU, they seem to be willing to accept the Eurosceptic rhetoric of party leaders. To
judge by the referendum results, about one fifth of the CE public was opposed to EU membership. As
less than 20 per cent of parliamentary deputies typically showed such an unequivocally negative
attitude, Euroscepticism is under- rather than over-mobilized and Eurosceptic citizens are over-represented among non-voters.

This again confirms that what matters in politics is not so much the distribution of opinions as their salience and intensity. Those who are more pro-EU are also more active and find the issue more relevant. In line with this the European issue is more salient for pro-European parties. This, however, is a situation that may well change as the ‘European issue’ shifts from the broad one of integration in principle to the diverse realities of what EU membership means in practice. In general, though, it seems that EU involvement has so far acted to weaken the representative capacities of national political parties. More recent analysis suggests, nevertheless, that CE electorates are more accurately represented by their parties than is the case in the older EU member states. But accurate representation might also be a double-edged sword for the relatively fragile CE democracies. Since most anti-EU parties are also critical of liberal democracy, better representation might also mean parliaments more dominated by anti-democratic actors. The quality of representation can also be evaluated comparatively in relation to the European Parliament elections. The domestic balance of forces was accurately mirrored in some EP elections but not in others. For example New Slovenia won the Slovenian, and the Moderates the Estonian EP elections, although both were marginal forces in their respective party systems. This divergence was evidently rooted in low turnout, and was directly shaped by the role of particular personalities and idiosyncratic events prior to the elections. In view of the role of such factors, there is little reason to expect the consolidation of EP party systems to be different from that of national party systems.

Overall EU impacts

In general we must conclude that in CE party politics the logic of national competition has overridden other logics, including that of the EU. But integration has still shaped party systems in various ways. Parties converge, though with significant exceptions, towards the classic European ideological patterns and are rapidly integrating with the European party federations. These European party federations, the Europarties, are the most crucial vehicles of standardization. The claim that parties can survive only if they fit into the party internationals (Ágh, 1998) proved to be too strong. But it is remarkable – and shows the strength of the European Union – that even parties with comfortable electoral support at home, like HZDS, have actively sought membership of a Europarty.

This pressure seems to be the weakest in Poland, which may have something to do with the sheer size of the country. The Polish example also highlights the contradiction between two meanings of the term ‘Europeanization’. On the one hand, Poland is the least ‘Europeanized’ among the countries analyzed, because a major segment of its party system rejects the ruling norms of European party politics. That
is, the EU could not penetrate the Polish parties to the extent it could other party systems. On the other
hand, the presence of Eurosceptic parties turns the EU into a more serious issue than it is in other party
systems. In this sense ‘Europe’ is more present in Poland – and now Bulgaria – than anywhere else in
the region. This echoes Mair’s distinction between the penetration of Europe into the domestic sphere
and the institutionalization of a distinct European political system. Note, however, that this is not
some CE peculiarity and is also seen in the UK where the country’s relations with Europe have ‘been
one of the most divisive and damaging issues’ in party politics since 1945.

Coalition alternatives and policy options have generally been constrained by the integration process.
CE party systems have neither radicalized nor became more moderate on the whole, but here have
been prominent examples of parties moderating their position in order to become more electable and
acceptable to potential partners (Romania, Slovakia). But the tendency to moderation has been
somewhat, though not completely, counterbalanced by instances of radical populist backlash (Poland,
Slovakia again, Bulgaria). The nature of the discontent has also changed as anti-minority nationalist
populism turned in some cases into economic populism as integration has progressed. The communist/
anti-communist cleavage also seems to have lost ground, and some ethnic parties now find themselves
in a pivotal position. But there is little strong evidence for the role of European integration in fuelling
these developments.

It is not possible to state generally whether the EU has affected the stability of CE party systems. The
EP elections elevated some minor parties and triggered government reshuffles (in the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary and Estonia). But few extra-parliamentary parties made a political breakthrough.
Most established parties used the elections as a dress rehearsal for the national election by collecting
information about voter preferences, experimenting with new campaign techniques, and improving
their relative position. There are some indications in the new member states that the European issue is
slowly turning from a valence issue into a positional issue, as differentiation between parties on
various EU-related policy domains has somewhat increased. The accession process has encouraged
some degree of cooperation, but there are few signs of an overall decline in party system polarization.
There are probably more coalitional formulae possible today than before in CE, but party competition
has not become less aggressive. Integration may well have increased the distance between elites and
citizens and depoliticized certain issues (where the acquis left little room for autonomous politics) but,
in contrast to claims made of WE, we cannot really speak of a ‘hollowing out’ of party competition.

Some organizational changes can be identified. The EU has had an impact on the internal norms of
some parties as far as gender quotas are considered. But party organization as a whole has not greatly
changed, although MEPs have often been given representation in the party leadership. The
innovations are likely to cause minor changes in party practice at best. MEP representation in the
national leadership of some Czech parties may strengthen the implementation of policy across diverse levels of governance. Some Western institutional practices have been emulated in Hungary, and the emergence of a new stratum of Europoliticians may improve strategy and enhance the quality of debate. Relatively strong national organization, conversely, seems to enhance effectiveness at the EU level; the Christian Democrats (KDH), for example, being the only Slovak party that had an MEP elected to chair an EP committee.

Many heavyweight CE politicians were elected or delegated to sit in Strasbourg and Brussels, and it is likely that the European component of the parties will play a larger role in the future than in most countries of the West. This is particularly true of the smallest countries like Estonia and Slovenia, where the leaders of two parties (United List and Liberal Democracy of Slovenia) are currently MEPs. Overall, it has been suggested, the overall effect of EU membership is likely to loosen the internal hierarchical structures of political parties as a result of new factional and territorial conflicts. On the other hand, the EU does seem to have had a significant affect on regulations about the financing of political parties and the introduction of more transparent regulation processes.

Attempts to estimate impacts of EU involvement also raise a number of methodological issues, and from this perspective an overall assessment of EU effects will not be easy to reach. The fundamental problems involved derive as much from questions of method and conceptual approach as from problems of empirical analysis – how should any such impact be properly conceived and how might influence actually be gauged? In effect, the problem lies in the old social science conundrum of causality and of how any discrete outcome can be accounted for amidst a vast range of mutual influences and interlocking relations.

The thorny issues of conceptualization and alternative definitions of Europeanization have not been raised here, but in relation to party politics it is clearly essential to distinguish between EU involvement in terms of the impact of pan-European structures and processes as a dominant part of the environment in which the institutions operate and involvement as it becomes an issue in its own right and a topic that may form, in one way or the other, a component of a party’s programme and its overall political strategy. The two aspects can be linked insofar as the very strength of the environmental influence has acted to neutralize EU involvement as an issue and remove it from the list of viable topics likely to feature on party programmes. The pervasiveness of EU impacts is nevertheless highly differentiated and far from unambiguous, leaving considerable scope for continuing variation in post-accession party politics in Central Europe.
Notes


12 S. Coss, ‘New EU heads of state need to learn old negotiating skills’, *European Voice* 29 April – 5 May 2004.

13 Paradowska and Baczyńska, ‘Wyborcy’. See also Ágh, ‘Europeanization of ECE Social Democracy’.


17 *ibid.*, p.217.


19 C. Chiva, ‘EU enlargement and the Bulgarian and Romanian party systems’, paper delivered to a conference on The EU’s South-Eastern Enlargement: Romania and Bulgaria in Comparative Perspective, European Studies Research Institute of the University of Salford, January 2007. Conflicts arising from European integration have often been found to be sharper within mainstream parties than between them; L. Hooghe and G. Marks, ‘European integration and democratic competition’, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis Unit, March 2004, p. 3. Equally, little variation among mainstream parties in established EU states on integration issues has been found, with parties of the extreme left and radical right much more likely to take up Eurosceptic positions. See D. J. Beers and N. Clark, ‘Euroscepticism in transition: public support for Euroskeptic parties in Eastern Europe and the National and transnational levels’, paper for conference of the EU Studies Association, Austin, 2005.


24 Although there was by no means complete congruence, and it has been argued by J. R. Koepeke and N. Ringe that CE practice has not followed that of older EU members in treating EP elections as second order events. See ‘The second-order model in an enlarged Europe’, European Union Politics vol.7, 3 (2006), p.341.


29 This section is based on and summarizes the findings of Z. Enyedi and P. G. Lewis, ‘The impact of the European Union on party politics in Central and Eastern Europe’, in Lewis and Mansfeldová, European Union and Party Politics, pp.231-49.

30 See Mair, ‘Limited impact’. The two cases where the EU has been argued to have had an impact on national politics in the pre-accession period are Poland and Bulgaria. See Lewis, ‘EU enlargement’ and Chiva, ‘EU enlargement’.

31 The past in the present: a cleavage theory of party response to European integration’, British Journal of Political Science vol. 20 (2000), pp.433-59. Mair has also come to endorse this view more strongly, see ‘Political parties and party systems’, p.159.


35 V. Sobell, ‘Central Europe unhinged’, Daiwa Institute of Research Ltd., p.2.


37 As suggested by A. Ágh, ‘The general crisis of ECE parties resulting from EU membership: external and internal Europeanization of ECE party systems’, paper delivered at Workshop on Globalising Party-Based Democracy, University of Warwick, July 2005.


39 P. G. Lewis, ‘Impacts of EU enlargement on party politics in Central Europe’, paper delivered to a conference on The EU’s South-Eastern Enlargement: Romania and Bulgaria in Comparative Perspective, European Studies Research Institute of the University of Salford, January 2007.

42 Lewis, ‘EU enlargement’, p.196.
43 Europe Undivided, p.170.
44 See T. Haughton, ‘When does the EU make a difference? Conditionality and the accession process in Central and Eastern Europe’, paper delivered at Annual Conference of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham (June 2006).
46 Slovak developments provide a key point of reference for the 2007 enlargement in this respect. In elections held in the three relevant countries between 2000 and 2002 it was only in Slovakia that reformers were ‘resoundingly re-elected’ while Romania, in particular, ‘trailed far behind’. As there were other incentives for the EU to accept Romania as a member, this might well have shown the strict limits placed on the EU capacity for leverage as a general practice (Vachudova, Europe Undivided, pp.208, 215). Later on Bulgaria turned out to be the most problematic candidate, although by the time of accession Romania’s reformist credentials again raised considerable doubts. See V. Pop, ‘Romanian parliament will stick out like sore thumb in EU’, euobserver.com, 22 December 2006.
52 Bartolini, Restructuring Europe, p.336.
53 The tensions between these two currents about a planned national treaty with the Vatican brought down the government in February 2006.
55 Restructuring Europe, p.335.
57 M. Spirova, ‘Europarties and party development in EU candidate states: PES and EPP in Bulgaria’, paper delivered to a conference on The EU’s South-Eastern Enlargement: Romania and Bulgaria in Comparative Perspective, European Studies Research Institute of the University of Salford, January 2007.
64 Bartolini, Restructuring Europe, p.322.


72 Rohrschneider and Whitefield, *Public Opinion*, pp.244-5.


77 ‘Political parties and party systems’, p.156.


81 Linek and Mansfeldová, ‘Impact of the EU’, p.36.


83 Henderson, ‘Slovak political parties’, p.163.

84 Bartolini, *Restructuring Europe*, p.358.
